Australia and New Zealand began engaging with the globalised economic environment from the 1960s through a gradual process of adaptation. Both countries began dismantling the 'protective state', spawning new governance practices and some new institutions. While the core political institutions of Westminster governance remained largely unchanged, they have proved particularly resilient and adaptive to change. The most pronounced impact of globalisation was evidenced through changed policy orientations and institutional behaviour at the national and sub-national levels. We focus on recent policy innovations in the fields of science and technology and tertiary education. Both cases indicate that these nations, governed at the time by parties of different political complexion, have anticipated and responded to globalisation in similar ways. We argue that these comparable policy responses can, at one level, be explained as responses to the imperatives of globalisation and international markets. However, at another level, they indicate that the 'nation-building' state has not disappeared but remains active in shaping and redirecting market mechanisms.
Introduction borders. It is assumed to have dramatic effects on states and citizens everywhere. Meanwhile, over the past two decades, Australian and New Zealand governments have led the world in the drive to realign their public sectors according to the principles of New Public Management (Schick 1996) . These reforms have changed not only the ways in which governments run their operations and deliver services but also how they 'think' in broader policy terms. Markets, liberalisation and publicsector reforms have influenced the forms of governance selected by these states. Together, these forces have not necessarily weakened the 'steering' capacity of the state but have transformed the means through which the state seeks to influence outcomes. Both Antipodean states have embraced, rather than resisted, globalisation through state preferences for institutional reform and policy innovation.
So, what are the connections between globalisation and state-level restructuring efforts? That question motivates this article. We focus on how recent changes in governance structures in Australia and New Zealand might be understood as responses to globalisation. Neither country has undertaken radical transformation in the main structures of governance in recent times. The core institutions of Westminster (responsible party government, Cabinet, parliament, ministerial accountability, and a non-partisan public service) have remained largely unchanged. Nevertheless, a range of other important institutions and governance practices have changed that deserve close scrutiny. Policy innovation has both responded to and anticipated globalisation. This evidence provides an interesting augmentation of Weiss's arguments on the myth of the powerless state (Weiss 1998) .
The effects of globalisation are readily apparent in the fields of science and technology and tertiary education. Over recent years, governments in Australia and New Zealand have noted the strategic significance of these fields for the future economic and social well-being of their citizens. In response, they have initiated new collaborative governance arrangements and created new policies to promote more coordination of effort and more positive outcomes. In the next section we discuss the countervailing complexities of globalisation as they present themselves to national governments. We then discuss globalisation as a set of integrative structuring forces, highlighting the ways in which these forces of globalisation serve to shape and constrain the choices faced by governments and business entities. Following that, we explore the nature of governance and offer a brief overview of the changing structures and processes of governance in Australia and New Zealand. From here, we focus our discussion on science and technology and tertiary education. Under governments of different persuasions, we analyse the similarities in the approaches taken in each country.
Countervailing Trends of Globalisation: Threats and Opportunities
Traditional ways of living, working, thinking, and consuming have all been affected by the emergence of closely connected global markets and the competition and innovation they have generated. Protective domestic regimes have come under strain, previous 'certainties' have disappeared (Kelly 1992) , and 'old-style interventionist' governments have found their policy choices narrowed (Davis and Keating 2000) . At the same time, globalisation has opened new opportunities for businesses, governments, and citizens. Markets and competition have emerged as more powerful determinants of national well-being, more important than government control and direction. Realignment and re-engineering, in place of barrier protection and regulatory restraint, can enable nations to benefit from these emerging opportunities.
Yet in this 'brave new world' the closer integration of transportation systems, communications, and commercial activities has introduced new vulnerabilities for states and citizens. There are heightened concerns about large numbers of businesses and talented individuals relocating overseas. Threats to national security from terrorism, the spread of disease, and natural disasters are more apparent now, even if an attack, an epidemic, or a disaster occurs well beyond a state's borders. Globalisation has also heightened awareness of threats to national security and personal safety that are both dramatic and potentially damaging (Fleming and Wood, forthcoming) . For Australia and New Zealand-along with many other countries-these threats are closely interwoven with economic activity. While governments have always worried about trade access and the competitiveness of their export sectors, they now have to contend with greater global uncertainties and insecurities.
Our interest lies in exploring how these countervailing aspects of globalisation have affected recent decision making in Australia and New Zealand in relation to the design of governance arrangements. In our view, the most interesting developments along these lines emerge from the efforts of governments in each country to anticipate and proactively manage the new elements of competition and choice that are the essential elements of globalisation. However, before we discuss these developments, we outline our interpretation of globalisation.
Globalisation as a Set of Integrative Structuring Forces
Globalisation is not some abstract phenomenon that 'happens' to other economies. Rather, each engagement (by nations, organisations and individuals) contributes to the processes of globalisation impacting on everyone else. We construe globalisation as a collection of forces and practices that shape behaviours, at the centre of which we find new forms of communication, commerce and exchange, efforts to increase (or reduce barriers to) international trade in goods and services, and transmission of knowledge. It can be measured in trade liberalisation, border flows of people, money, goods and services, cultural exchange, and the transmission of ideas and values. Others have discussed it in moral terms as 'one world' with reciprocal responsibilities for issues such as human rights, climate change and world poverty.
We suggest that the growing integration of the global economy has had two principal, though not coterminous, effects: first to propel the imperatives for reform on national governments; and, second, to disseminate ideas and ideologies that promulgate preferred solutions to identified problems. The imperatives can appear as positive or negative reinforcements. Viewed positively, they offer strategic power to businesses seeking to achieve its preferred goals. Viewed negatively, these imperatives serve as punitive sanctions that can be imposed on laggards or recalcitrant states. The international marketplace for ideas has promoted neo-liberal ideologies and spawned a 'universal convergence' around notions of 'good governance', to borrow from Williamson (1993, 17) . Promoted by international organisations, think tanks, and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, there has been widespread dissemination of what is termed 'good economic management', 'free trade', 'corporate governance' and, in the government sector, 'sound financial management'. Key thinkers-the new intellectual globalisershave also had significant impact on the thinking of policy makers in many countries, in particular the competitive ideas of Michael Porter (1990) and, more recently, the 'creative class' and economic vibrancy arguments of Richard Florida (2002) .
The iterative nature of these two effects often presents national policy makers with stark choices. The responses of state actors can be explained as necessary responses to changing circumstances, but they can also be presented as the efforts of local actors to embrace ideas consistent with notions of 'good economic management' emanating from prominent international institutions. This raises the theoretical question as to how much structural reform in any country at a given time is compelled by economic fundamentals versus the desire for politicians and their advisors to follow fashionable practices from elsewhere.
Occasionally, political leaders will seek to knit these effects together in their exhortations to suggest that 'there is no alternative'. During their respective terms as the Prime Ministers of Britain, New Zealand and Australia, Margaret Thatcher (1979-90), David Lange (1984-89) and Paul Keating (1991-96) Globalisation has to be embraced, and we can be winners from it. A world without borders is made for a trading economy like New Zealand's. A world with the means of instant communication, irrespective of geographical distance, is made for countries like ours. We have to make globalisation work for us, not sulk and let it work against us. (Clark 2001) This statement makes it clear that nations face both imperatives but have choices as to how they might respond to globalisation. They could decide either to 'embrace' it or 'sulk' about it. No country could possibly stand in the way of globalisation, and the implication of Clark's comment is that failure to 'embrace' it could seriously harm a country's economic fortunes. Since the endowments of natural resources and other geographical characteristics that were once critical in determining the economic advantages and disadvantages of nations are now becoming less relevant, globalisation represents a key structuring force for individual national economies.
Here a key point emerges. While globalisation serves as a set of integrative structuring forces impacting on national polities and economies, it does not follow that all countries will adopt uniform policy settings. Room remains for countries to come to their own choices about the speed and degree to which they want to engage with globalisation. For instance, many forms of engagement have emerged through mutual agreements or bilateral negotiations among individual nations seeking to promote gains for their own citizens. Thus, the Closer Economic Relations initiative between Australia and New Zealand established in 1983, the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico that took effect from 1994, and the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Australia that began in 2005, all represent efforts that have supported the process of globalisation.
The Changing Nature of Governance in the Public Sector
The nature of governance in the public realm is often ambivalent and amorphous, because it is derived from legacies built up over decades and mediated by the repeated exercise of political power. The inherited pattern of governance structures and institutional behaviours emerges from evolving political battles that produce compromises and the development of structures that might not accord with anyone's notion of what would work best (Bok 2001; Moe 1991) . Whereas governance in the private sector generally involves the control of organisations, in the public sector it involves political management of a web of ongoing relations. Governance by the state over the economy and society is about appropriateness and acceptability-it is not simply a management arrangement for ensuring consistency between dayto-day activities and corporate organisational goals.
Furthermore, different accountabilities apply in the public realm (Mulgan 1997 (Mulgan , 2003 . The ultimate control of governments and governance structures lies in the hands of citizens, through legitimate systems of democratic decision making, party competition, and regular and fair elections, with provision for opposition and dissent. Vesting final authority and oversight in the hands of citizens is one of the most significant elements in attaining orderly governance in society. The creation and maintenance of such political systems requires regular ratification and deliberate choice, as through other mechanisms does the creation and maintenance of legal systems, tax systems, and the rules of markets, industrial relations systems and the like. Other significant choices about and consequences of governance structures flow from these basic precepts.
In light of this, public managers often must find ways to work creatively within the governance structures they inhabit, with the goal of achieving effective and efficient results. Feldman and Khademian (2002) have suggested that much of the work of managers in the public sector actually involves governance, because it is the key relationships that these managers establish that make the difference between perceptions of success and failure. Other scholars have suggested that all countries come to exhibit unique governance traditions and that elite actors operate within particular belief systems, even if refracted over time, that constrain how they will decide or act at various points (Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003; March and Olsen 1995) . This historical institutionalist perspective on governance helps us understand how traditions and path dependencies can shape and constrain the choices of government officials and their advisors.
Yet, in many countries, national structures of governance came under strain during the 1980s and 1990s. This became an intense period of restructuring along neo-liberal lines with the selective adoption of market principles and business techniques (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998; Christensen and Laegreid 2001) .
1 Countries began to experiment with new regulatory frameworks, less direct intervention, less government ownership and involvement, new ways of organising state functions and provision, and new policy settings (New Zealand Treasury 1984; NCA 1996) . Managed markets and facilitative guidance became the preferred mode of governing the economy in an international context (see Keating 2004; Bell 1997 ). In the process many governments re-adapted some of the key structures of governance affecting the economy.
Changing Structures and Processes of Governance in the Antipodes
Australia and New Zealand were at the forefront in adapting some key components in their structures of governance to the new world order. Their stated intention was to make their economies more internationally competitive (Bollard 1993; Garnaut 1 There are some notable exceptions-Japan and Germany, in particular, largely resisted these reforms or allowed them to pass them by-often perceiving that they were an Anglo-American obsession. 1993). At first the process of adaptation involved dismantling and deregulating the vestiges of insularity (Kelly 1992) , but over time efforts were made to restructure key aspects of state governance for national capacity building, compelled by concerns to shore up economic and social well-being in a more competitive global marketplace (Keating 2004) . Their actions were consistent with globally diffusing ideas about the virtues of free markets and appropriate national policy settings.
Both countries discarded their highly regulated currency exchange rates and chose to float their 'small-volume' currencies in the early 1980s. Tariff barriers were deliberately dismantled, often by sudden sizeable cuts followed by periods of detrimental reductions. Fiscal deficits were eliminated and governments in both countries began paying down public debt. Central banks were strengthened and ceded greater independence. Both countries established national competition bodies with broad mandates to enforce corporation law, trade practices, fair competition and market regulation. Both countries broadened their tax base with the introduction of broadbased goods and service taxation. These reforms not only created more competition in the Australian and New Zealand economies but changed the way governments exercised their responsibilities vis-à-vis business and the market.
Inside government, Australia and New Zealand pioneered managerialism and new public management during the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms were intended to increase flexibility and responsiveness, orientate their public services towards a 'results culture', increase the efficiency and effectiveness of programs, and heighten the political control and management of agencies. New governance structures and practices were introduced for public agencies-beginning with fixed-term contracts for (non-permanent) secretaries, contractual employment for the senior executive grades, preferences for outsourcing and contestable service provision, and in New Zealand a stronger principal -agent separation between smaller policy departments and delivery agencies (Halligan 2004; O'Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999; Aucoin 1995; Schick 1996; Kettl 2000) .
In the wider public sector, many public agencies were transformed into stateowned enterprises (Uhrig 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998) . Some were subsequently sold into private control (Easton 1997; Feigenbaum, Henig and Hamnett 1998; Walker and Conn-Walker 2000) . Such reforms led to a burgeoning of interest in governance among scholars of public administration (Heinrich, Hill and Lynn 2004; Kettl 2002; Rhodes 1997) .
With greater competition and choice emerging as a result of globalisation, governments in Australia and New Zealand have had to explore appropriate strategies to ensure that their economies and societies realise the benefits of globalisation and are protected from the risks that it can pose. Policy makers in both countries still have effective instruments at their disposal to grapple with the effects of globalisation. Various authors have written about the new 'tools' of governance (eg Salamon 2002), or the new governance challenges with which policy makers must wrestle. For instance, Kettl (2002, 147) has argued that two challenges are most pressing: adaptation and capacity building-where adaptation involves 'fitting traditional vertical systems to the new challenges of globalisation and devolution' and capacity building implies 'enhancing government's ability to govern and manage effectively in this transformed environment'. These ideas help us to make sense of the situation in Australia and New Zealand. Governments in both countries are now engaged in strategies of national capacity building which work within a market context. These include efforts at joined-up government, public-private partnerships, and use of networks that span a range of institutions and interests. The new approaches being used to govern science and technology and tertiary education in both countries do not represent fundamental shifts in governance arrangements but they do indicate a turn in thinking about policy making and the scope and purpose of government. As such, they give an opportunity to reflect upon the changing nature of governance and how that is linked to globalisation.
Reappraising Governance: Policies for Growth, Innovation, Science and Technology
Recently, Australia and New Zealand have sought to improve the performance of key parts or their science and technology sectors. In Australia, these activities have taken place under the rubric of the Commonwealth government's Backing Australia's Ability strategy launched in 2001. In New Zealand, the government's policy orientation has been guided by the Growth and Innovation Framework launched in 2002. In both cases, the resulting structures cut across traditional policy domains and join up players in governmental and non-governmental contexts. Further, these strategies appear to have been developed as a direct response to globalising trends.
Here we see Australian and New Zealand governments introducing new governance structures with an eye to promoting better economic and social outcomes, relative to other countries viewed as economic competitors. These strategies are founded on an understanding of the need to actively address national capacity building.
Australia's Backing Australia's Ability Strategy
The Backing Australia's Ability strategy followed a major report into business assistance programs entitled Going for Growth, which had been commissioned by the incoming Howard Coalition government in late 1996. The review was headed by David Mortimer-a businessman (TNT Asia Pacific)-and largely staffed by officials from the Department of Industry, Science and Technology. Released in July 1997, the report was aimed at enhancing business competitiveness, encouraging innovation, boosting investment and stimulating research and development expenditure. The approach and recommendations were in no way neo-liberal in character but were framed from an alternative paradigm involving facilitative and selective governmental interventionism. It was industry policy, although the government 'did not speak its name'. The strategy combined a range of pro-business distributive and regulatory instruments with selective interventions based on financial support shaped by 'value-chain' analysis (Porter 1990) . It sought to redirect the market with some instruments and enable greater global competitiveness.
The report was initially criticised by the Treasury for advocating annual 'growth targets' for 10 years, but many of the messages contained in the report about the need for better coordination and implementation were heeded. In December 1997 the government released a funding program entitled Investing for Growth which increased spending on business innovation by $1.26 bn over four years-a strategy coordinated through the Prime Minister's department. government released an education White Paper entitled Knowledge and Innovation, which linked these ideas to the direction of educational policy. In the 1998 election campaign the Coalition also committed to organising a key business summit on innovation. Backing Australia's Ability: An Innovation Action Plan for the Future built on this legacy of thinking. It was a research-driven strategy aimed at enhancing national economic potential and allowing Australian firms to compete in a globalised world. In launching the package, Prime Minister John Howard said a key element of success in building a 'prosperous future' would be 'our capacity to generate new ideas and bring them to life as innovative and exciting new Australian products, services and businesses' (Howard 2001) . The aim of the strategy was to secure Australia's economic future by building an 'even more highly skilled workforce' and creating 'opportunities for the commercialisation of new ideas' (Howard 2001) . It was designed to 'encourage and support innovation and enhance Australia's international competitiveness, economic prosperity and social wellbeing' (Backing Australia's Ability 2001, 7).
The plan was released with the Budget in May 2001. The five-year strategy allocated $2.9 bn from budget year 2001 -02 ($736 m for business-related university research, $583 m on research infrastructure, $176 m for world-class centres of excellence, additional support for R&D, including a premium rate of 175% tax rebate for business R&D, extra university places for science and technology, and programs to foster scientific, mathematical and technological skills in schools). A National Innovation Summit was held in February 2000 with the aim of securing business input into the innovation plan, and to follow through with an implementation group to prioritise policy proposals. This had some parallels back to the Hawke Economic Summit of 1983 (McEachern 1986), but also some 'bandwagoning' of European and Asian 'tiger' models of industry policy guidance and delivery.
The strategy was noteworthy not only because it increased government largesse to business and parcelled up support in a much more comprehensive way but also because it jointly involved industry in the design and delivery of the programs. As a series of related measures calculated to boost innovation and competitiveness, the government chose to deliver the strategy as an 'industry-government partnership' (Backing Australia's Ability 2001, 12). It effectively established new microgovernance structures involving new forms of mutual exchange and reciprocal engagement between government and business over shared objectives. Examples include the Industry Research and Development Board, which has representatives from industry, management and academia and is responsible for allocating and administering R&D grants of over $1.3 bn over 10 years.
Evaluation of the strategy has been effected through two independent reviews to the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR), and through bi-annual surveys of recipients conducted by the department (reporting against outcome measures and key performance indicators). A performance audit by the Australian National Audit Office was conducted in 2005 on part of the strategy (DITR's administration of the R&D Start Program). This audit found that the program was 'well managed' and that its governance arrangements were 'clearly articulated'; it also found that while some improvement in the performance reporting could be made, the economic benefits of the program 'have been of the order of $4.50 for every R&D Start dollar' expended (ANAO 2005, 6 ).
In the meantime, an extension of this package was announced in 2004-entitled Backing Australia's Ability: Building our Future through Science and Innovation-which suggested the government was also satisfied with the way the program was working and that its economic outcomes justified the fiscal and administrative commitments.
New Zealand's Growth and Innovation Framework
When the New Zealand Labour Party came to office in 1999, in a Coalition government with the smaller, Left-wing Progressive Party, it began introducing a series of policies aimed at giving a greater coordinating role to government in areas considered important to national development. This led to the creation of two important policies: the Growth and Innovation Framework and the Tertiary Education Strategy. Prime Minister Helen Clark has contrasted these initiatives with the neo-liberal policies pursued by New Zealand governments in the 1980 and 1990s, which in creating more market-like freedom often resulted in a competitive free-for-all that had detrimental effects. The new policy initiatives devolve key decisions to the local and organisational levels. However, they are intended to guide and coordinate activities in given industry sectors. Governments have a unique ability to develop strategies and bring a range of actors together to work for common goals. Securing our country's niche in the global economy in a way which builds high living standards for all is not a task which can be left to market forces. It requires clear and deliberate strategies both to grow the cake, and then ensure that it is fairly distributed. The World Commission's Report notes that 'one effect of globalisation has been to reduce the space for national macroeconomic policy', but there are policy instruments which can be used. Our government has been busy creating those instruments.
The Growth and Innovation Framework has four main components. These are intended to integrate government policies through collaboration and shared outcomes. They are: first, strengthening the innovation system; second, developing and retaining skills and talents; third, increasing international connections; and, fourth, engaging with enabling sectors. Initiatives to strengthen the innovation system involve building capabilities in firms and creating more high-growth, high-value firms. These components require cross-government engagement with non-government entities that could have productivity-enhancing effects across the whole economy. This has meant focusing on the sectors considered likely to be winners in export markets. The Framework designates biotechnology, information and communication technologies, design, and screen production as sectors potentially able to give New Zealand an overall competitive edge in the global knowledge economy. In working with others to implement the policy, the newly created Ministry of Economic Development has helped develop many industry cluster taskforces to lead industry-driven strategies in these sectors. Implementation of the Growth and Innovation Framework indicates that the New Zealand government recognises the challenges of adapting the national economy and society to a fast-changing, increasingly knowledge-based global economy (True 2006) . It is doing so in a manner that recognises the limits to government action in a marketled national and international economy.
Reappraising Governance in the Tertiary Education Sector
Within the past two decades, three common trends have emerged in government policy towards higher education. First, there has been a growing realisation that 'the world is in the grips of a "soft revolution" in which knowledge is replacing physical resources as the main driver of economic growth' (Wooldrige 2005, 3) . Second, many governments have introduced tertiary education fees (or partial fees) in a bid to balance the goal of seeing more young people in tertiary education with the goal of avoiding escalating fiscal pressures. Third, tertiary education providers have increasingly sought to attract foreign, full-fee-paying students in order to enhance their revenues, especially where government funding has not kept pace with cost pressures. Evidence from 2003 indicates that, as a percentage of all tertiary students, foreign fee-paying students were more visible on Australian campuses than anywhere else in the OECD, making up almost 18% of the total student population (the OECD average was less than 7%). The percentage of foreign students in New Zealand tertiary institutions was also shown to be more than twice the OECD average, representing a big leap compared with a decade earlier. Exports of educational services now rank among the top service exports for both countries (OECD 2005, sec. C3). These three trends, which are closely linked to aspects of globalisation, have informed recent discussions and reforms around the governance of tertiary education in both Australia and New Zealand.
Springboard Australia: Tertiary Education as Innovator and Exporter
Australian governments transformed their tertiary educational policies by serendipity and default rather than by a single conscious design. Responsibility for universities (and for funding their growth) was transferred from the States to the Commonwealth in 1974, giving the national government more policy authority in driving the sector. Initially, the Commonwealth chose to provide free tertiary education to a privileged few in the highly regulated traditional university sector from 1973 to 1987. But gradually in the 1980s pressures rose within government to restructure the tertiary sector, focusing on institutions and intake. In 1988 the Commonwealth introduced co-payments through a Higher Education Contribution scheme (which enabled students to pay upfront or defer payments through the taxation system). The number of universities delivering tertiary education was also massively expanded from 15 to around 35 as institutes of technology and colleges of advanced education changed their status and began delivering degrees and postgraduate qualifications. In the latter half of the 1980s, the Hawke government (especially under Education Minister John Dawkins) began to increase Commonwealth-funded student places while insisting on university amalgamations (Coaldrake and Stedman 1998, 49-141) .
In one sense the national government's tertiary education policy was an emergent strategy in Mintzberg's terms (Mintzberg, Quinn and Ghoshal 1998) . Accordingly, its aims were unclear and contradictory from the start-some components stressed market-led aspirations while others stressed more central regulation (Karmel 2001) . Gradually, however, the Commonwealth turned its policy attention to skill building and the shortage of particular labour market skills. In June 1999 the Howard government released a major discussion paper entitled New Knowledge, New Opportunities which was intended to point to likely government policy intentions while soliciting wider input, especially from education providers and industry. The paper argued that Australia was at the threshold of 'two great research-based revolutions' in biotechnology and information and communication technology. But the government, and especially David Kemp, the new education minister, wanted to move quickly and so within just six months produced the new framework for its policy strategy. This framework, entitled Knowledge and Innovation: A Policy Statement on Research and Research Training, was released in December 1999. The policy outlined new ways of managing 'the producers of knowledge' and guiding their research by competitive and performance-based funding systems. Minister Kemp (1999, 1) 
stated:
We must ensure that Australia keeps pace with the global revolution in knowledge production and its use; is an attractive site for research and development investment; and provides opportunities for our best and brightest researchers and innovators.
The main problems identified in the previous system of research funding involved a disconnection between research and national innovation in industry; a lack of incentives to excel or experiment; insufficient critical mass or concentrations of research strength; assessments that research graduates were not adequately prepared for employment; and that the research grants system and training were wasteful, slow and had low completion rates. But the government preferred to address these problems through decentralised competition and incentive structures not through the establishment of another overarching super-commission (the Hawke government had abolished the last tertiary education commission in 1987). The higher education division of the department (DEST) began to play a much more directive policy role.
Kemp wanted greater responsiveness from both the Australian Research Council (ARC) and from the major research institutions. Although the policy statement did not increase funding or provide more funded research places in research institutions, it sought to change the entire basis of how research was funded and managed. National priorities featuring innovation and technology guided research funding, institutions were rewarded for performance, institutional grants were allocated according to performance-based measures, competitive schemes were enhanced, and funds were diverted to enhance the building of critical mass in research areas. The ARC was required not merely to allocate grants fairly through peer academic review but also to play a 'more strategic role in providing advice on the allocation of funding' to support the advancement of knowledge 'to maximise its contribution to the national innovation system'. Institutions were also required to demonstrate that they were managing their research efforts well and providing quality assurance, including with evidence of external or end-user verification.
The 1999 policy statement represented a watershed change in the attitude to tertiary research by the Commonwealth. The changed policy thinking subsequently unleashed a series of further reforms through the ARC, universities, funding schemes, and involving industry representatives. While the priorities and incentives were substantially realigned, the government was far less prescriptive or specific about how research efforts would actually relate to the 'national innovation system'. Largely institutions and industry were asked to establish their own links and management structures to sustain such relationships.
Alongside this knowledge strategy, universities were increasingly expected to become 'cash cows' and significant earners of export dollars-through funding caps on public funding, relaxing ceilings on places, and punitive measures for non-compliance. Universities had been permitted to accept overseas fee-paying students since 1986. The numbers of full-fee paying students gradually rose to around 7% of total enrolments by 1994-95 but then exploded to 18% in 2003 and over 22% by 2004. Some universities became highly dependent on this uncertain market, with over 30% of enrolments coming from overseas. To inject further attractions into the Australian market, the government also announced a series of links between immigration and tertiary study in Australia, enabling completing overseas students to increase their chances of gaining permanent residency. Immigration policy was further linked to skills and educational training. In the late 1990s the government adjusted a number of other migration programs to speed entry and take higher quotas of business migrants and those with particular skills considered to be in short supply in Australia. Migrants with specific IT skills could gain visas, as could overseas students enrolling in certain approved technology courses. However, by 2006 there were mounting concerns (raised primarily by universities and the Productivity Commission) that such schemes, while attractive in the shortterm, created distorted labour market demand, altered local university preferences and led to unintended distortions in educational programs. Such developments required entrepreneurial universities to change the ways they managed their businesses (Considine and Marginson 2000; Davis 2005 ).
New Zealand's Tertiary Education Strategy
Since the release of the report on post-compulsory education and training in 1988, known as the Hawke Report, the tertiary sector in New Zealand has become more market driven and subject to ongoing governmental reform efforts (Kelsey 2003) . Like Australia, the most notable changes in the sector over the past 15 years have involved the imposition of cost-related student fees and the increasing number of foreign students being recruited by public and private tertiary providers. Government funding for tertiary providers has also become more strongly tied to the number of effective full-time student enrolments. During the 1990s, competition for students emerged among tertiary providers and some providers began to offer gimmicky courses with limited educational content in a bid to attract more students. Upon gaining office in late 1999, the Labour-led Coalition government pledged to make changes in the tertiary sector. In her first major speech as Prime Minister, Helen Clark (1999) made the following observation:
. . . New Zealand's skills production in those areas relevant to the new knowledgebased industries has been inadequate. A competitive model in tertiary education has 172 M. MINTROM AND J. WANNA led to unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of both the quality and the appropriateness of the skills produced . . . It is crucial that government policies ensure that New Zealand transforms the base of its economy much faster than has been the case in recent years. The future must be one of a high skills, high employment, high value added economy. We need to be innovative and adaptive to changing international demands.
The challenge for the new government was clear. It needed to achieve better coordination and quality control in the tertiary education sector, while still ensuring good participation rates and protecting the burgeoning of education as an export sector.
While in office, the Labour-led government established a Tertiary Education Commission. The Commission takes an active role in facilitating collaboration and cooperation in the tertiary education system, and ensures that tertiary institutions create and maintain sound links to the wider business and community sectors of New Zealand society. The decision to establish a commission as opposed to working within existing governmental structures reflected a desire on the part of the government to avoid the replication of traditional bureaucratic structures (Shaw and Eichbaum 2005) . In terms of governance, we interpret this as an important shift, because the Commission form allows more representation of stakeholders in the development of strategy. That gives more opportunities for relevant information from diverse sources to influence the setting of strategic objectives for the sector. Creation of a commission also signals an understanding within government that it must seek to lead rather than manage the tertiary sector. With government funding comprising a shrinking proportion of revenue for many tertiary providers, the goal of working in partnership with tertiary institutions is also politically astute.
In 2002, the government released its Tertiary Education Strategy 2002-07. This document emphasised the importance of having a quality sector that can allow New Zealand to respond positively to globalisation, as the following statement attests:
Underlying globalisation and technological change places an importance on new knowledge and skills, and their application. The countries that retain or achieve first-world living standards will be those that respond actively to these trends. For New Zealand, there are new opportunities for achieving prosperity by applying our skills and knowledge on the increasingly accessible global stage. (New Zealand Ministry of Education 2002, 11) Objectives listed in the Tertiary Education Strategy for strengthening the capability and quality of the system include improving leadership, increasing differentiation and specialisation, and attaining sustainable growth of export education 'centred on a reputation for quality teaching and pastoral care ' (2002, 24) . This last objective reinforces the government's detailed policy statement on export education released in 2001 (New Zealand Ministry of Education 2001). Since its inception in 2002, the Tertiary Education Commission has introduced several audit exercises and a performance-based research funding regime modelled on the research assessment exercises that have been in place for some years in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Sweden (Boston 2002) . Overall, recent changes in how the government engages with the tertiary education sector in New Zealand reflect a sound understanding of the strategic position of the sector to an export-led, knowledge economy operating in a globalising context. Governance changes in the sector have been deliberately initiated to ensure the sector, while led by devolved decision making, nonetheless evolves in a coherent manner, informed by global best practices.
Responding to or Anticipating the Imperatives of Globalisation?
Under governments of different persuasions, both Australia and New Zealand have responded to the challenges of globalisation by pursuing pro-active policies and strategies. They have adopted similar strategies at similar times, not through 'policy learning' or 'policy transfer' but through separate experimentation and innovation in policy settings. They have attempted to reposition their economies not through old protectionism but through facilitative interventions aimed at building capacity and skills. They have found new ways to combine or reallocate resources, used creative incentive frameworks and employed various other policy instruments. These governments have chosen not to address global challenges in a unilateral manner, but to involve business and service providers in both policy setting and in the delivery of subsequent programs or services.
The two cases discussed here-science and technology innovation for industry and skills development in tertiary education-indicate that Antipodean governments have not resigned themselves to the buffeting forces of globalisation. Rather, they have been experimenting in selected policy fields with what Weiss has called 'transformative capacity ' (1998) . In doing so they are accelerating integration with international markets and trends. Antipodean strategies towards globalisation are aimed at strengthening national capacities to benefit from global markets.
New modes of governance are also emerging which emphasise less the public provision of services or regulatory protection and more the leadership and coordinating role of government. Facilitative state strategies aim to enhance the effectiveness of policy and improve implementation. Incentive structures within funding regimes have been used to assist sectors to become aggressively global-as we have seen with universities and overseas students. These strategies are premised on national governments working with and through local businesses and organisations to achieve shared objectives. Under globalisation, policy making typically involves reciprocal obligations and responsibilities, mutual engagement around problems, and greater coordination between policy sectors that can affect the desired outcome. More reliance is placed on public-private partnerships and joint involvement with industry. Furthermore, as policy is increasingly seen as interlinked, the art of dovetailing policy instruments in one sector to desired outcomes in another is largely a matter for government. Governments, more so than other actors, are in a better position to negotiate and facilitate these sectoral interconnections and policy pathways. Recent governmental action in the Antipodes has been less associated with ideology or party political complexion and more with new thinking about preferred governance arrangements. Based on this analysis of evidence from Australia and New Zealand, we expect that, in an economic environment characterised by competition and choice, governments elsewhere will also become more actively involved in the initiation and guidance of policy responses.
